In a two period decision problem, we study individuals who, in the second period, may be tempted by ex ante inferior choices. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent the feasible choices in the second period. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, her temptation ranking, and her cost of self-control. We provide an axiomatic model of temptation to justify the main assumption of our representation theorem and to analyze second period behavior.
Introduction
Individuals often choose an alternative deemed inferior ex ante. This "inconsistency", widely documented in experimental settings (see Rabin (1997) for a survey), is attributed to the divergence of preferences reflecting long-run self-interest and behavior motivated by short-run cravings and other visceral factors (Loewenstein (1996) ). As an example, consider an individual who must decide what to eat for lunch. She may choose a vegetarian dish or a hamburger. In the morning, when no hunger is felt, she prefers the healthy, vegetarian dish. At lunchtime, the hungry individual experiences a craving for the hamburger.
The decision-maker has two remedies to lessen the conflict between her ex ante ranking of options and her short-run cravings. First, she may engage in activities that limit ex post options. In the extreme case, the individual may be able to commit to her ex ante preferred choice and thereby eliminate all conflict. Second, the individual may exercise self-control. Self-control lowers the utility of the individual but allows her to resist the options that are most tempting. Individuals will frequently use both remedies. In the lunch example, the individual may visit a vegetarian restaurant to exclude the hamburger from the option set. However, even the vegetarian restaurant offers unhealthy desserts and self-control may be used to resist that temptation.
To illustrate these ideas more formally, let x denote the vegetarian meal and let y be the hamburger. There are two periods, morning and lunchtime. Consumption takes place at lunchtime when the individual must pick a meal from a menu. In the morning, the individual chooses among menus and hence has preferences over sets of alternatives.
The singleton sets {x} and {y} describe situations where the individual is committed to choose one or the other meal at lunchtime. A situation where the individual must choose between x and y at lunchtime described by {x, y}.
In the morning, the individual experiences no temptation and ranks x above y. This is captured by a strict preference of {x} over {y}. At lunchtime, the agent may be tempted by y. We capture this with a preference that ranks {x} strictly above {x, y}. Thus, temptation creates a preference for commitment. If no commitment is made, then the agent either succumbs to temptation or exercises self-control. In the former case, {x, y} is indifferent to the singleton set {y} because the menu {x, y} leads to the choice y. In the latter case, {x, y} is strictly preferred to {y}. This describes a situation where the agent chooses x from the set {x, y} but suffers from the availability of y. Self-control at {x, y} is therefore identified with {x} {x, y} {y}. Self-control enables the agent to choose the vegetarian meal and hence makes her better off than she would be if she had to choose the hamburger, y. On the other hand, the availability of the hamburger creates temptation and therefore, she is worse off than she would be if she were committed to the vegetarian meal, x.
In our model, the agent has preferences over sets of lotteries. Our axioms (described below) allow both a preference for commitment and self-control. We refer to the resulting preferences as temptation preferences with self-control or simply self-control preferences and show in Theorem 1 that they can be represented by a function U of the form:
Both u and v are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. The function v describes the agent's urges in period 2. The function u describes the agents ranking over singleton sets, that is, the ranking when she can avoid temptation through commitment.
We refer to v as the agent's temptation ranking and u as her commitment ranking of lotteries. We interpret max y∈A v(y) − v(x) as the (utility) cost of self-control. Since this cost is always positive, the presence of temptation always lowers the agent's utility. The representation also suggests a choice behavior in the second period. Choosing a lottery to maximize u + v represents the optimal comprise between the utility that could have been achieved under commitment and the cost of self-control.
Three of the four axioms of Theorem 1 are natural extensions of the standard axioms of expected utility theory: (i) the preferences over sets are complete and transitive, (ii) they satisfy continuity and (iii) the independence axiom. The fourth axiom requires that if A is weakly preferred to B then A ∪ B is in fact "between" A and B, i.e., A is weakly preferred to A ∪ B which in turn is weakly preferred to B. We call this axiom Set Betweenness. A standard decision-maker experiences no temptation and therefore judges sets by their best elements. If such a decision-maker prefers the set A to the set B, it follows that she is indifferent between the sets A and A∪B. In other words, adding the options in the set B to A does not change the best element and therefore does not affect her utility. By contrast, the individual described in this paper may suffer from the availability of additional options.
Set Betweenness allows for this possibility.
Together the four axioms are equivalent to the representation described above. In our interpretation, temptation may lead to a preference for commitment (i.e., A A ∪ B).
When such a situation arises and commitment is not possible, the agent may either succumb to temptation A ∪ B ∼ B or use self-control A ∪ B B. The agent decides which is the best course of action based on the cost of self-control.
In our representation, the cost of self-control is determined by the relative magnitudes of u and v. We also examine the limiting case where self-control is prohibitively costly.
In that case, the individual always gives in to her temptation, that is, chooses the lottery that maximizes v but evaluates these choices using u. 
u(x) subject to v(x) ≥ v(y) for all y ∈ A
We call such behavior temptation without self-control or overwhelming temptation. To generalize self-control preferences to allow for overwhelming temptation, we weaken the continuity axiom of Theorem 1. In Theorem 2, we show that this weaker continuity axiom together with the remaining assumptions of Theorem 1, are satisfied if and only if preferences can be represented by one of the two representations above.
To this point, we have analyzed and represented period 1 preferences. In section 4 we analyze period 2 behavior. To do this, we extend the individual's preferences to include a choice from the set in period 2. Thus, we assume that the agent has preferences
We make the following three assumption on * . First, making the same choice from a larger set cannot increase the individuals utility ((A, x) * (B, x) if A ⊂ B). Second, we say that y tempts x (denoted by y T x) if ({x}, x) * ({x, y}, x) and assume that the resulting temptation ranking is complete and transitive. Third, we assume that if (A, x) * (A∪{y}, x) then y is the most tempting element in A∪{y}. This third assumption says that "only the most tempting element in a set matters".
If the extended preference * satisfies these three assumptions and a weak form of continuity, then the induced first period preference satisfies Set Betweenness. This justifies our interpretation of Set Betweenness as capturing an individual who struggles with temptation. If, in addition, the induced preferences * 1 satisfy the axioms of the representation theorems, then the second period choice behavior is as suggested by the representations: individuals with self-control preferences maximize u+v and individuals with overwhelming temptation preferences lexicographically maximize first v and then u.
Starting with Strotz (1955) , the possibility of a preference for commitment has received some attention. This literature assumes that in period 1, the agent has preferences over lotteries that are different from her preferences in period 2. The change of preferences that occurs between period 1 and period 2 is called dynamic inconsistency. The benefit of commitment emerges from the first self's desire to "game" her future self.
In the model considered here, the agent's preferences do not change between periods.
That is, there is no dynamic inconsistency. Our representation theorems are derived from axioms on the agent's first period preferences over sets of lotteries. Our main assumption, Set Betweenness, allows us to incorporate temptation and the resulting desire for commitment into a model with dynamically consistent preferences.
Temptation without self-control has the same behavioral implications as Strotz's model of dynamically inconsistent decision-makers. However, Strotz's model allows unambiguous welfare comparisons only when all "selfs" are made better off. Therefore, the elimination of an option can never lead to a clear-cut increase in welfare. By contrast our, dynamically consistent decision-maker is unambiguously better off when ex ante undesirable temptations are no longer available.
As an application of our representation theorems, we develop a measure of preference for commitment and a measure of self-control. We say that 1 has greater preference for commitment than 2 , if 1 benefits from commitment whenever 2 benefits from commitment. Our representation theorems assign to each preference relation i a pair of utility functions (u i , v i ). In Theorem 6 we utilize this representation and characterize a greater preference for commitment in terms of the (u i , v i ). The theorem shows than 1 has a greater preference that 2 if u 1 and v 1 are "further apart" than u 2 and v 2 , that is, the indifference for u 2 and v 2 are a convex combination of the indifference curves for u 1 and v 1 .
We say that 1 has more self-control than 2 if whenever 1 succumbs to temptation, so does 2 . Since overwhelming temptation preferences never exhibit self-control, the measure of self-control applies only to self-control preferences. In Theorem 8 we shows that 1 has more self-control than 2 if the indifference curves for u 2 + v 2 and v 2 are a convex combination of the indifference curves for u 1 + v 1 and v 1 . Recall that individual in period 2 maximizes the utility function u + v. If u + v is very different from the temptation ranking v then the agent frequently exercises self-control. Hence, if u 2 + v 2 and v 2 are closer together than u 1 + v 1 and v 1 then 2 will exercise self-control less frequently than
1 .
An individual's preference for commitment increases when the commitment ranking u and the temptation ranking v grow further apart whereas her self-control increases when the utility function defining choice behavior in the second period u + v and the temptation ranking v grow further apart. Hence, it is possible for preference for commitment and self-control to vary independently.
Conceptually, our work relates to the psychology literature on temptation and visceral cues as well as the experimental and theoretical papers on dynamic inconsistency mentioned above. In terms of the formalism, our work is most closely related to the two papers on preference for flexibility. Following Kreps (1979) we study preferences over sets of alternatives. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1999) analyze and extend Kreps' representation of preference for flexibility. The idea of modeling the set of alternatives as lotteries and utilizing the resulting linear structure by imposing the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms was introduced in an earlier version of their paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide the model and analyze self-control preferences. In Section 3 we present the general representation theorem that covers temptation with and without self-control and examine the uniqueness of this representation. In Section 4, we demonstrate how our notion of temptation can be used to formulate a dynamically consistent model of preference for commitment. We use this formulation both to analyze second period choice behavior and interpret Set Betweenness.
Section 5 contains the comparative measures of preference for commitment and self-control.
Section 6 relates our approach to preferences for commitment to the one that is offered in the literature on dynamic inconsistency.
A Model of Self-Control
We analyze the following two-period decision problem. Consumption only occurs in the second period. At time 2, the agent chooses a consumption (a lottery). Following Kreps (1979) we describe the decision problem at time 1 as the choice of a set of lotteries which constitutes the feasible choices at time 2. Sections 2 and 3 analyze the preferences at time 1. Section 4 extends those preferences to time 2.
Let (Z, d) be a compact metric space, where Z is the set of all prizes. Let ∆ denote the set of all measures on the Borel σ− algebra of Z. We endow ∆, the set of all lotteries, with the weak topology. Hence, ∆ is metrizable. The objects of our analysis are subsets of ∆. Let A denote the set of compact subsets of ∆. The binary relation is a subset of A × A. 1 We endow A with the topology generated by the (Hausdorff) metric
where d p is a metric that generates the weak topology. Define αA
We impose the following axioms:
is a complete and transitive binary relation. The first two axioms play the same role here as they do in more familiar contexts.
To understand the motivation for Independence consider an extension of the decisionmaker's preferences to the set of lotteries over A. Assume A B and suppose we give the decision-maker the choice between the lottery that yields A with probability α and C with
The interpretation is that in either case the randomization occurs prior to the choice in period 2. In period 2, the decision-maker is left with A or C in one case and B or C in the other.
In this setting, the standard justification for the independence axiom applies: the fact that C may occur in either case should not interfere with the preference for A versus B and
Suppose that the decision-maker satisfies this version of the independence axiom and, in addition, is indifferent as to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. In that case, the decision-maker is indifferent whether the uncertainty regarding A or C is resolved before or after her choice in period 2. The situation where the uncertainty is resolved after her choice in period 2 is represented by the convex combination αA + (1 − α)C. Thus, the decision-maker satisfies Independence if (1) she satisfies the usual independence axiom and (2) she is indifferent as to when uncertainty is resolved.
A "standard" decision-maker who experiences no temptation and hence has no preference for commitment satisfies Axioms 1 − 3 and, in addition, is only interested in the best element of a set. Therefore, such a decision-maker also satisfies the axiom A B The following axiom permits preference for commitment.
Axiom 4: (Set Betweenness) A B implies A A ∪ B B.
Set Betweenness can be understood as an implication of our notion of temptation.
An option that is not chosen in period 2 may affect the utility of the decision-maker because it presents a temptation. We assume that a temptation is utility decreasing, that is, an alternative that is not chosen cannot increase the utility of the decision-maker.
Furthermore, lotteries can be ranked according to how tempting they are and only the most tempting option available affects the agent's utility.
In section 4 we give a precise statement of these conditions and Theorem 4 demonstrates that they imply Set Betweenness. Here, we provide an intuitive explanation of why One could imagine models of temptation that lead to violations of Set Betweenness. More generally, the temptation ranking may fail standard axioms of rational choice such as transitivity. These axioms can be questioned even for agents who display no preference for commitment. The case for imposing these axioms on the description of the agents' temptations is no stronger.
Our objective is to provide a model close enough to the standard model so that the difference in behavior can be attributed solely to the presence of temptation. A narrower definition of temptation is more appropriate for this purpose. We have attempted to rule out any deviation from the standard model that cannot be interpreted as a form of temptation as well as more elaborate formulations of temptation that rely on processing costs, random choice or deviations from the expected utility hypothesis.
We say that the function U : A → IR represents the preference when A B iff U ({a, b}) = U ({a}) or U ({a, b}) = U ({b}).) Thus, the change in utility as we vary b must
for all x. Then, define
Lemma 4 shows that the v so defined is indeed linear, and independent of the particular choice of a and b. Lemma 5 shows that the representation is valid for all two-element sets.
Theorem 1 then follows from Lemma 2 3
When faced with singleton sets, the decision-maker is an expected utility maximizer with utility function u. A singleton set represents the situation where the individual can commit in period 1 to a consumption choice in period 2. Therefore, we say that u represents the commitment ranking of lotteries and refer to u(x) as the commitment utility of the choice x.
The decision-maker's preferences are defined over sets and thus characterize choice behavior only in the first period. Nevertheless, the representation suggests the following choice behavior in the second period: the agent chooses an element in A that maximizes u + v. In Section 4 we provide a model of second period preferences and give conditions so that maximizing u + v is indeed the choice behavior in the second period.
We interpret v as representing the temptation ranking and v(x) − max y∈A v(y) as the disutility of self-control. To motivate this interpretation, consider x, y with {x} {x, y}.
In this case, y is tempting the decision-maker and, in particular, y is more tempting refers to behavior at time 1, the planning period, while self-control refers to behavior at time 2, the consumption period.
Temptation with and without Self-Control
In this section, we generalize the preferences studied in the previous section to include decision-makers who cannot resist temptation. At time 2, such decision-makers choose according to some preference relation. This choice behavior is anticipated at time 1 and preferences over choice sets reflect the predicted behavior at time 2.
Recall that for preferences that satisfy Axioms 1 − 4, the cost of self-control depends 
and U represents . show that R can be represented by a linear utility function v. This in turn allows us to get the representation of no self-control preferences for finite sets. The final step is to extend the representations to all elements of A. This is done in Lemma 8 using Axioms 2a and 4.
We call the set of preferences characterized by Theorem 2 temptation preferences. We 
Temptation, Set Betweenness and Second Period Choice
This section analyzes behavior in the second period. To motivate our approach, consider a different, but more familiar two-stage decision problem. Suppose in period 1, the agent makes a costly investment decision I and in period 2, she makes a consumption choice c. The agent's overall utility V , depends both on her investment I and her consumption c. The investment decision has three potential consequences. First, it affects the set of feasible choices in period 2. Second, it has a direct effect on utility since there is a cost to investment. That is, for a fixed c, V (I, c) varies as I varies. Finally, the investment decision may influence how the agent ranks various alternatives in period 2.
When the agent compares two different investment choices in the first period, she assigns to each investment the maximal utility she can achieve in the second period. In this way, V induces preferences over investment choices and the agent's preferences are consistent across time periods.
In our model of temptation an individual is in a situation similar to the one facing the investor above. The set of lotteries, A, chosen in the first period, is analogous to the investment choice. It determines which consumption choices are feasible in the second period. Like the investment decision, the choice of A has a direct effect on overall utility through its impact on the cost of self-control. In addition, the impact of temptation on the decision may depend on the set of options and hence the decision-maker's ranking over alternatives in period 2 may depend directly on A. 4 Extended preferences are defined over pairs (A, x) where x is a choice from A. Let * be a preference relation on S := {(A, x) ∈ A × ∆ : x ∈ A}. We assume that * is upper semi-continuous preference relation.
Axiom 1 * :
* is a preference relation. For example, suppose that the extended preferences * can be represented by a utility function
In period 2, the dynamically consistent agent with utility function U * chooses x ∈ A that maximizes U * (A, ·) and therefore, in period 1, this individual evaluates the set A according
. Hence, such an agent's induced first period preference over sets, * 1 is the self-control preference represented by (u, v). Alternatively, define m := min x∈A u(x) and suppose * can be represented by
In period 2, an agent with this utility function chooses some x ∈ A that lexicographically maximizes first v and then u. Hence, in this case * 1 is the overwhelming temptation preference (u, v).
Clearly, the preference * represented by the U * described above is not the only extended preference that induces a given temptation preference (u, v). A particular temptation preference can be extended to a preference relation on S in many ways. 
The second axiom says that if y tempts x then x does not tempt y. The last axiom states that if the addition of an option y increases the cost of self-control then y must be the most tempting alternative among all available options. In short: only the most tempting option matters. These axioms correspond to the properties of temptation discussed informally in section 2.
In addition, we require * to be singleton continuous. In Theorem 6 we show that if a temptation preference is extended in a manner that satisfies the temptation axioms, then the induced second period choice behavior is as suggested by our representation theorems.
Below we assume that * is minimally congruent. Minimal congruence requires that a worst element for the commitment ranking, u, is not tempting. For example, if the set of prizes Z are quantities of "goods" and both u and v satisfy first order stochastic dominance then minimal congruence holds.
Definition: * is minimally congruent if A {x} for all A implies ({x, y}, x) ∼ * ({x}, x)
for all x ∈ ∆. For a self-control preference (u, v), the associated second period choice maximizes u + v. Similarly, for overwhelming temptation preferences the second period choice lexicographically maximizes first v and then u. Hence, in the terminology of our investment example the third potential effect of the "investment" A is absent: the ranking over alternatives induced by * is independent of A. This feature of second period choice behavior does not follow from weak continuity and the temptation axioms but from Independence of the induced preference. Below, we give an example of a utility function that leads to choice behavior that cannot be represented as maximization of a set-independent utility function even though it satisfies Axioms 2 * a,2 * c, T 1 − 3.
Consider the preferences represented by
where Consequently, an agent with these extended preferences may violate Houthakker's Axiom and choose only x from the set A and only y from some set B even though x, y ∈ A ∩ B.
Measures of Preference for Commitment and Self-Control
In this section, we provide measures of preference for commitment and of self-control.
Definition:
The preference 1 has greater preference for commitment than 2 
for some α, β ∈ [0, 1] and some γ > 0 Proof: See Appendix.
Consider the indifference curves of u 1 , v 1 , u 2 and v 2 through a lottery x ∈ ∆. The theorem says that 1 has more preference for commitment than 2 if and only if the indifference curve of u 2 and v 2 are each a convex combination of the indifference curves of u 1 and v 1 . Therefore 1 has greater preference for commitment than 2 if and only if the commitment ranking and temptation ranking associated with 2 are closer together than the commitment ranking and temptation ranking associated with 1 . This is to be expected since the benefit of commitment arises from the discrepancy between these two rankings.
To see the sufficiency part of Theorem 7, suppose that (u 2 , v 2 ) has no preference for commitment at A. This means that u 1 and v 1 have a common maximizer x in A.
Clearly, the same maximizer continues to work for (u 2 , v 2 ) since each is a positive linear combinations of two utility functions that pick x ∈ A. Thus, whenever 1 has no preference for commitment neither does 2 . For the converse we prove that whenever (u 1 , v 1 ) and (u 2 , v 2 ) are not on the same two-dimensional plane we can find a pair of lotteries (x, y) such that u 2 or v 2 is indifferent between x and y but the utility functions u 1 and v 1 rank x and y differently. Clearly, this implies that 1 is dynamically consistent but 2 is not.
Before providing an analogous measure for self-control, we provide a characterization theorem. Three notions of self-control are proven to be equivalent: (i) our earlier definition based on preferences over sets; (ii) an intuitive definition of self-control as an individual's ability to resist temptation; (iii) a revealed preference definition based on the observation that an agent with self-control might prefer set A to B even when the same choice is being made from both sets. Recall that c(·, u + v) is the second period choice behavior corresponding to the self-control preference . 
The preference 1 has more self-control than 2 if, for all A ∈ A, 2 has self-control at A implies 1 has self-control at A.
As one might expect, overwhelming temptation corresponds to the minimal level of self-control. Therefore, when characterizing the level of self-control we restrict attention to self-control preferences. Theorem 9 provides a characterization of comparative self-control similar to the characterization of comparative preference for commitment in Theorem 7. 
Proof: Given the characterization of self-control provided in (ii) of Theorem 8, the proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 7 and therefore omitted.
Consider the indifference curves of
The theorem says that 1 has more self-control than 2 if and only if the indifference curve of u 2 + v 2 and v 2 are each a convex combination of the indifference curves of u 1 + v 1 and v 1 . Theorem 8 therefore establishes that 1 has more self-control than 2 if and only if the preference that describes choice behavior u+v is closer to the temptation ranking for 2 than it is for 1 . This is to be expected since self-control refers to the conflict between the agent's second period behavior and temptation.
Recall that for 1 to have greater preference for commitment than 2 , (u 2 , v 2 ) must be closer together than (u 1 , u 1 ). In contrast, for 1 to have more self-control than 2 , (u 2 + v 2 , v 2 ) must be closer together than (u 1 + v 1 , v 1 ). Hence, it is possible for 1 to be greater preference for commitment than 2 and yet have more self-control than 2 . Let 1 and 2 be two regular self-control preferences. Suppose 1 is represented by (u 1 , v 1 ) and 2 is represented by (u 1 + βv 1 , γv 1 ) . We can distinguish the following cases:
1. β > 0, γ = 1: In this case 1 has greater preference for commitment than and more self-control than 2 .
2. β ∈ (0, 1), γ = (1 − β): In this case 1 has greater preference for commitment than 2 but both have the same level of self-control. 3. β = 0, γ ∈ (0, 1): In this case both have the same level of preference for commitment but 2 has more self-control than 1 .
4. β > 0, 0 < γ < 1 − β: In this case 1 has greater preference for commitment than 2 and 2 has more self-control than 1 .
Temptation versus Change in Preference
In this paper we offer two related conceptual innovations. First, we propose that temptation rather than a preference change ("dynamic inconsistency") may be the cause of a preference for commitment. Second, we introduce a model in which agents resist temptation, that is, use self-control. The representation of self-control preferences allows us quantify the cost of self-control as a utility penalty that applies whenever the ultimate choice is not the most tempting one. Our model enables us to distinguish between selfcontrol, which occurs at time of consumption, and commitment, which takes place earlier.
Our model of self-control yields both different behavioral and normative implications than the change in preference approach. An agent with self-control may be worse off when an irrelevant alternative is added to her set of options. That is, we may have A A ∪ {x} even though x is ultimately not chosen from the set A ∪ {x}. Put differently, removing a non-binding constraint may reduce an agent's utility. Hence, unlike dynamically inconsistent agents or agents with overwhelming temptation, decision-makers with self-control will expend resources to remove tempting alternatives from their choice sets even if they do not expect to succumb to the temptation in the future. To see why this is relevant, consider a representative agent model of an asset market where one asset offers commitment. In a model of changing tastes, the illiquid asset only benefits the agent if its purchase leads to a binding constraint. In other words, the representative agent must hold zero units of the liquid asset in some state of the world to generate a premium for an asset offering commitment. This is in contrast to a model of self-control where such a premium may exist even if the agent is never constrained.
Our model of temptation without self-control leads to the same testable implications as Strotz's model of dynamic inconsistency. Still, the two approaches are not equivalent.
A model with dynamic inconsistency rarely leads to clear-cut welfare analysis. When each agent has multiple-selves, the impact of a given policy on a single agent is typically ambiguous. By contrast, removing temptation makes our, dynamically consistent, agents unambiguously better off.
Appendix
It is straightforward to verify that preferences represented by utility functions of the form given in Theorem 1 satisfy the Axioms 1 − 4. Verifying the "if" part of Theorem 2 is equally straightforward and hence omitted. 
Hence, W restricted to singleton sets is continuous. If satisfies Strong Continuity then W is continuous. Setting U = W yields the result.
Our second Lemma demonstrates that we may identify the utility of any finite set with an appropriate two-element subset. The two elements can be found by a "maxmin" or "minmax" operation.
Lemma 2:
Let U be a function that represents some satisfying Axiom 4. If A ∈ A is a finite set then, U (A) = max x∈A min y∈A U ({x, y}) = min y∈A max x∈A U ({x, y}). Moreover, there is an x * , y * that (x * , y * ) solves the maxmin and (y * , x * ) solves the minmax problem.
Proof: Supposeū = max x∈A min y∈A U ({x, y}) and (x * , y * ) is a solutions to this problem.
We first show that U (A) ≥ū. Note that by construction U ({x * , y}) ≥ū, ∀y ∈ A. Therefore, repeated application of Set Betweenness implies U (A) = U (∪ y∈A {x * , y}) ≥ū. To see that
This proves the first equality. A symmetric argument proves the second equality.
Let (x * , y) be a solution to the maxmin problem and (y * , x) be a solution to the minmax problem. Observe that U ({x
, {x * , y * } solves the maxmin and {y * , x * } minmax problem.
Lemma 3: Let U be a linear function that represents some satisfying Axiom 4. If

U ({x}) > U({x, y}) > U({y}), U ({a}) > U({a, b}) > U({b}) then
First, observe that linearity implies
It remains to be shown that (w * , z
where the last inequality again follows from linearity. Similarly, if w
We define the function u : ∆ → IR as
Observe that u is linear since U is linear.
Lemma 4: Let U be a linear function that represents some satisfying Axiom 4. Sup-
pose that U ({a}) > U({a, (1 − δ)b + δz}) > U({(1 − δ)b + δz}) for all z ∈ ∆. Then, (i) ∀z such that U ({a}) > U({a, z}) > U({z}), v(z; a, b, δ) = U ({a, b}) − U ({a, z}) (ii) v(a; a, b, δ) = U ({a, b}) − U ({a}) (iii) v(αz + (1 − α)z ; a, b, δ) = αv(z; a, b, δ) + (1 − α)v(z ; a, b, δ). (iv) v(z; a, b, δ) = v(z; a, b, δ ), ∀δ ∈ (0, δ). (v) Suppose that U ({x}) > U({x, (1 − δ)y + δz}) > U({(1 − δ)y + δz}) for all z ∈ ∆. Then v(z; a, b, δ) = v(z; x, y, δ) + v(y; a, b, δ).
Proof:
Part 1: Observe that under the hypothesis of the Lemma we may apply Lemma 3 to
and hence simplifying the definition of v(z; a, b, δ) yields the result.
Part 2: Note that
by the linearity of U . Hence, (ii) follows from the definition of v.
Part 3: Applying Lemma 3 and the linearity of U we obtain
The definition of v now implies part (iii).
Part 4: Let δ < δ. Observe that
Moreover, since (a, (1 − δ)b + δz) and (a, b) satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 3 it follows
Hence, (iv) follows from the definition of v.
Part 5: We need to show that
which is equivalent to
We apply Lemma 3 to conclude that both sides are equal to
Lemma 5: Let U be a linear function that represents some satisfying Axiom 4. Con- 
Second, consider the case where
We claim that
Since ( 
Then, it follows from the definition of v(y; a, b, δ) that the above inequality hold iff
and therefore
as desired. 
and hence the cases are exhaustive. To prove the claim, for all α ∈ [0, 1], let
and observe that f is well defined, continuous and f (0) = 0, f(1) = 1 and hence takes on the value 1/2 at some α * ∈ (0, 1). Hence α * satisfies inequality ( * ).
Observe that we can approximate any compact set A, by a sequence of finite sets A k , as follows: Let
Both U and are continuous and hence, the representation can be extended to arbitrary sets.
Proof of Theorem 2
By Lemma 1, a linear representation U , of the preferences exists. Therefore, Lemma's 3, 4 and 5 also hold if Axiom 2. Next, we show that one of the two desired representations exists for all finite subsets of ∆. 
z}) > U({z}).
Proof: Since the restriction of U to singleton subsets of ∆ is continuous, there exists a neighborhood of y, N y such that U ({x}) > U({z}) for all z ∈ N y . By Set Betweenness, 
Since y is in the relative interior of ∆, we can choose z k ∈ ∆, δ k ∈ (0, 1) with δ k → 0 such
. On the other hand, Set Betweenness implies that
Since U is continuous when restricted to singleton sets, U { exists then the agent has no self-control. Then, we prove that no self-control implies that the second type of representation holds for all finite subsets of ∆. , U({x}),
, a contradiction. 
Let S ⊂ ∆ 2 denote the set of pairs (x * , y * ) such that (x * , y * ) is a solution to the maxmin and (y * , x * ) is a solution to the minmax problem above. By Lemma 2, The set S is non-empty.
Step 1: (x * , y * ) ∈ S implies x * ∈ A\B and y 
Assume the first equality holds. Then,
, by Lemma 2, there exists w ∈ A such that To interpret the above definition, note that whenever {x} ∼ {y} then {x, y} ∼ {x} implies that the temptation ranking of x higher than that of y. If the decision-maker is indifferent between the singleton sets x and y then we cannot infer their temptation rankings by comparing {x, y} and {x}. However, if for some z, {x} ∼ {x, z} and {y} ∼ {y, z} then the temptation ranking of x must be higher than that of y. Moreover, by Upper Semi Continuity and Lower Singleton Continuity, the restriction of U to singleton sets is continuous. To prove Independence, assume that xP y and α ∈ (0, 1).
Step 1: Let {x} ∼ {y}. Hence U ({x}) = U ({x, y}). By linearity, U ({αx+(1−α)z}) =
Step 2: Let {x} ∼ {y}. To complete the proof, we will show that R satisfies von Neumann-Morgenstern continuity. That is, there exists α, β such that αx + (1 − α)z y βx + (1 − β)z whenever xP yP z, Assume that xP yP z.
Step 3 To prove the first assertion, assume that U ({y,
for some sequence β k ∈ (0, 1) converging to 0. Then, by Upper Semi-Continuity and the continuity of U on singleton sets, we obtain {y, z} {z} and hence {y, z} ∼ {y}, a contradiction. The proof of the second assertion follows from a similar argument.
Step To prove the first assertion, assume that U ({y,
for some sequence β k ∈ (0, 1) converging to 0. Since U is linear, we can assume wlog 
A Lemma on Linear Independence
The following Lemma is used in the proof of Theorems 3 and 7. The proofs of the two facts stated after the Lemma follow from the argument used in proving Lemma 9. Let e := (1, 1, . . . , 1) . 
